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Products Liability: Should Illinois

Allow Recovery for Property Damage
Absent Personal Injury?
THOMAS

J. O'BRIEN*

In this article, Judge O'Brien identifies the factors which should allow or
deny recovery for property damage in product liability cases absent personal injury. In identifying these factors, the various types of damages are classified.
Thereafter, an analysis is made to determine what types of damages should be
recoverable under Illinois law.

Since Dean Prosser recorded his views in regard to products
liability, most jurisdictions have, on one theory or another,
adopted this doctrine.' As articles of commerce became more complex and expensive, the remedies for defective manufacture could
no longer be limited (if indeed they ever were) to recovery solely
for personal injury. This fact was formally recognized by the Restatement of Torts Second2 in 1965. It has been 15 years since the
drafters of the Restatement indicated their intent to include property damage as well as personal injury within product liability law.
Nevertheless, the extent of allowable recovery is still undetermined
in product liability actions where only damage to property occurs.
In order fully to comprehend the nature of this many-sided
problem in the products liability field, consider the following scenario. Assume a motel owner notices that the air conditioners installed in each of his units are functioning erratically. After only
two seasons' use, some of these air conditioners, although cooling,
do not reach a comfortable temperature. Therefore, the units cannot be rented in hot weather. Some of these air conditioners, because of design defects, allow wintry drafts to invade the room.
Several have rusted and become inoperable because of internal defects. Some have allowed excess condensation to damage draperies
and carpeting. A few, because of defective wiring, have caught fire
and damaged adjoining rooms. Finally, upon examination of the
* Judge, Circuit Court, 1st Municipal District, Cook County, Illinois. B.A.,
De Paul University (1956). J.D., De Paul University (1959).
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of George Fisher, third
year law student of Loyola University, in the compilation and development of this
article.
1. PROSSER, TORTS, § 96 at 66 (3d ed. 1964).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (3) (1965).
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units that are marginally working, it has been determined that a
defective part must be replaced to prevent future damage to those
air conditioners. However, the warranties that were available have
expired or have been disclaimed.
The above example illustrates the various types of product liability losses ranging from the immediately recognizable product
damage to what some courts have labeled "economic loss." It further raises some interesting questions in the products liability field
in Illinois. First, to what extent will Illinois courts recognize recovery for damages beyond personal injury in products liability actions? Second, what elements ought to exist before recovery is allowed? Finally, is there any uniform definition applicable to these
various types of damages?
In analyzing the questions posed above, a brief review of Illinois case law is necessary. The 1965 benchmark case of Suvada v.
White Motor Companys held that a cause of action in negligence
or strict liability lies against the maker of a product who is not in
privity with the purchaser for the cost of repair of the product itself (a tractor-trailer) as well as damage to other property (another
vehicle). While Suvada has spawned a virtual landslide of case law
particularly dealing with personal injuries, there are but a few Illinois cases that have addressed the property damage question in
detail.
In November of 1965, two months after Suvada, Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc." considered whether
recovery should be allowed against a remote manufacturer of air
conditioning units who was sued by a motel owner for damage to
other property, loss of rental income, and replacement costs of the
units. The plaintiff alleged that the units were negligently made
and that the manufacturer had breached an implied warranty of
merchantability in that the units
leaked water or other liquids into motel rooms, ... were not dependable and required constant servicing and in cool weather it
was necessary to remove outside louvers and block up the exterior
vents so as to prevent excessive chilling.... 5
Although the appellate court denied recovery in contract, it reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, holding "[t]here
3. 51111. App. 2d 318, 201 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist. 1964), aff'd 32 I1. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965).
4. 68 Ill. App. 2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1st Dist. 1965).
5. Id. at 301, 216 N.E.2d at 284.
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is no question but that a purchaser may sue a manufacturer with
whom he is not in privity where the cause of action arises in negligence." In quoting Suvada, the court observed:
Implicit in Lindroth v. Walgreen Co.' was the view that the general rule ... is that a manufacturer may be liable for injuries to a
person not in privity with him and that such liability is governed
by the same principles governing any action for negligence.7 (Citations omitted.)
Only months later, the same court in Rhodes PharmacalCo. v.
Continental Can Co. 8 denied recovery for damage to only property
interests where the plaintiff sought recovery under the then newly
recognized theory of strict liability. Rhodes involved a remote
manufacturer of aerosol cans who was sued by the seller of hair
spray for breach of an implied warranty. It was claimed that the
cans leaked and caused damage to other store property and inventory, requiring plaintiff to make refunds to its customers and to
pay for costs of return which resulted in loss of good will and
profits.'
The trial court dismissed the complaint in Rhodes. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that although there were no direct contractual dealings with the manufacturer of the cans, the lack of privity
was no defense in a strict liability action under Suvada. In rejecting that argument, the appellate court agreed with the defendant's argument that "the instant case cannot meet the requirements for the application of the doctrine of strict liability in
tort. . ." and held that "We are not persuaded that the doctrine of
strict tort liability should be applied here." 10
It was not until 1977 that an Illinois Appellate Court again
addressed the problem of recovery for property damage absent
personal injury under a products liability theory. In a case of first
impression in Illinois, Koplin v. Chrysler Corp.," the court held
that there can be no recovery in tort (strict liability or negligence)
6. 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595 (1st Dist. 1946).
7. 68 Ill. App. 2d at 305, 216 N.E.2d at 286.
8. 72 Ill. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1st Dist. 1966).
9. Id. at 366, 219 N.E.2d at 729.
10. Id. at 368, 219 N.E.2d at 730. The court, in declining to recognize recovery in strict liability observed that "because the product sold by this defendant
was not unreasonably dangerous . .. [and] was subject to further processing by
others .

.

. plaintiff is not the consumer or user the doctrine is designed to

protect."
11. 49 II. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (2d Dist. 1977).
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for property damage only since it constituted a "purely economic

loss."

In Koplin, the plaintiff filed a three count complaint. Count I
was in warranty against the manufacturer, supplier, and installer.
Count II was brought against all three defendants for negligent installation, manufacture, and service of air conditioning equipment.
Count III prayed for damages for the cost of repair and replacement. 12 The case was submitted to the jury on apparently all three
theories and a verdict for the plaintiff was returned. On appeal, the
appellate court reversed the judgment, finding no support for the
verdict based upon a warranty theory (the warranty had expired or
otherwise had been effectively disclaimed). Also, after a lengthy
discussion as to the negligence theory set forth, the court found the
type of damages involved to be "economic loss" and, therefore, not
recoverable under tort liability. s
More recently, the Illinois Appellate Court denied recovery for
economic loss based upon a negligence theory in the case of Album
Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co.' The plaintiff, a maker of
cosmetic cases, sued its immediate seller, a manufacturer of adhesives, claiming the latter negligently formulated, tested, and gave
inadequate instruction in regard to the application of its product,
causing the cosmetic cases to come apart."1 No further characterization of the damage was made other than it was agreed to have
been "economic loss." Although the defendants relied upon Koplin
12. The specific allegations were set forth in n.2 at 101:
that the equipment in question was installed, manufactured and supervised by the defendants in such a wrongful, faulty, negligent and unsuitable manner that it did not function to cool the premises in question as
anticipated. . . that the defendants and each of them installed, manufactured and serviced the air conditioning equipment in such a defective
way that it did not function as could reasonably be expected, and it still
does not so function. . . that the defendants and each of them failed to
install the air conditioning in question in a good and sufficient manner as
may be expected reasonably of equipment of its kind and description.
There was no allegation that an accident or violent incident occurred as
a result
of defendants' negligence that caused any of the "damage." Id. at 196, 364
N.E.2d
at 101.
13. Id. at 203, 364 N.E.2d at 107.
14. - Ill. App. 3d -, - N.E.2d -, No. 79-1183 (1st Dist. 1980).
15. Id. The plaintiff had alleged in other courts the existence of express
warranties, implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose, and fraud.
The former two counts were dismissed by the trial court on the basis of disclaimer
and
limitation of liability clauses, but reversed on appeal and held not to be
terms of
the original contract based upon the well pleaded facts.
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and the plaintiff urged the court to reject it, the appellate court
determined that Koplin was a case where the parties were not in
privity. Therefore, the court chose to resolve the issue on the basis
of privity. Specifically, the court found the issue to be whether recovery can be had for purely economic losses for failure of a party
to perform duties imposed upon it by contract. To recognize such
cause of action in tort, the court observed, would lead to the result
that "contract law would no longer be distinguishable from tort
law."'16 Thus, the Album Graphics court held that where the parties are in privity and the damages suffered are only economic loss,
no tort action lies.
There have been no other reported cases in Illinois further defining what constitutes "economic loss." There is a tendency, however, to indiscriminately claim all damage, other than personal injury or damage to "other" property, to be "economic loss."
Frequently, as a trial judge, the author has presided over motions
to dismiss negligence or strict liability actions where only damage
to the product itself is involved. Citing selective language in Koplin, the movants have claimed that the cost of repair or replacement, where only the product sustained damage, constituted "economic loss," and, therefore, was not actionable. 7
The purpose of this article is to identify the factors which
should allow or deny recovery for property damage in product liability cases absent personal injury. In identifying these factors, the
various types of damage will be classified. Thereafter, an analysis
will be made to determine what types of damages should be recoverable under Illinois law. It is to be noted that in discussing the
various types of damage hereafter described, two elements will always be missing: first, personal injury - that is to say, "bodily
harm" as defined in the Restatement of Torts Second,"8 and second, the right of recovery under a contract theory, such as warranty liability. 1 Inclusion of either of the above elements in a
products liability case would necessarily change the outcome for
16. Id.
17. See Peldyak, Recovery in Tort for Property Damage Absent PersonalInjury, 68 ILL. BAR. J. 94 (Oct. 1979).
18. RESTATzMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (1965).
19. U.S.C. §§ 2-313, 2-318, and 2-719. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 26, §§ 2-313, 2-318,
and 2-719 (1979). For the purpose of illustrating the following types of damage,
the author makes no distinction between the absence of contractual relations and
the presence of disclaimers or limitations attempting to bar recovery where contractual relations do exist.
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property damage recovery. On the other hand, two elements will
always be present: an internal defect in the product, and some
damage or potential damage to the product itself as a result of that
defect.
TYPES OF DAMAGE

The various types of damage can be classified into six categories: spontaneous physical damage to the product itself as a result
of an internal defect; spontaneous physical damage to the product
itself as a result of an internal defect that also causes physical
damage to other property; spontaneous physical damage to the
product itself as a result of an internal defect that also causes
other types of non-property damage; non-spontaneous damage to
the product itself as a result of a defect internal to the product
that causes the product to fail to function according to the purchaser's expectations; non-spontaneous damage to the product itself as a result of an internal defect that causes the product to fail
to function according to the purchaser's expectations and results in
other types of non-property damage; and damage suffered as a result of the necessity of repairing or replacing a defective part to
prevent spontaneous or non-spontaneous damage.
With the foregoing types of damages firmly in mind, the next
step is to inquire as to which of these types classify as "economic
loss" in Illinois. Is all property damage, absent personal injury, economic loss? More precisely, is physical damage solely to the product itself compensable in Illinois under negligence or strict liability
theories, or is this type of damage, as in Koplin, characterized as
"economic loss?" The author has found no Illinois case precisely
on point.
Previous commentators have suggested that the inquiry into
which economic interests ought to be protected "should. . .proceed
without regard to labels." It has been further observed that although ". . .recovery does not come within the existing legal
framework, this does not necessarily foreclose the imposition of liability, for law may grow to meet current social needs."' 0 Recently,
a Michigan Appellate Court emphasized the importance of an examination of the facts and the results of each case as opposed to
the legal theory adopted .2 Following this advice, the author will
20. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L.
REv. 917, 943 (1966).
21. In Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Company, 26 Mich. App. 602, 182
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analyze the potential factual situations which give rise to property
damage and determine if the products liability doctrine should be
a remedy available to plaintiffs.
Type One Loss: Spontaneous Damage to the Product As a Result
of an Internal Defect
The first category of loss involves spontaneous damage to the
product as a result of an internal defect. The common elements
characteristic of this type are: a defect in the product exists, as
opposed to the product wearing out due to age or overuse; a spontaneous event occurs, such as an accident involving a fire or some
type of explosion; the defect is the proximate cause of the spontaneous event; and physical damage occurs to the product itself. An
example of this type of loss is the fire damage to an air conditioner
caused by its defective wiring.
If one accepts the definition of economic loss as including
physical damage to the product itself, then the Koplin decision
clearly bars recovery in Illinois for Type One loss - in either strict
liability or negligence. It is the author's opinion, however, that Koplin was a Type Four and Five loss - a loss not due to a spontaneous event. In other words, Koplin was a "wear out" or "disappointment of economic expectation" case.
Closer to Type One loss would seem to be Suvada v. White
Motor Co. 2 s In Suvada, a trailer truck collided with a bus, the
spontaneous event, as a result of a defective brake. There was no
element of direct personal injury involved (albeit plaintiff sued in
indemnity for reimbursement of a personal injury settlement that
was made with a third party). Furthermore, recovery was sought
for damage to the plaintiff's vehicle, a unit complete within itself.
N.W.2d 800 (Ct. App. 1971), the court stated:
The need to eliminate the old terminology becomes apparent upon examination of the cases, not only in Michigan, but in other jurisdictions as
well. Recovery has been allowed on a number of different theories against
manufacturers for economic loss caused by defective products. Many of
these cases could be limited and distinguished if we look too closely at
the legal theories advanced by the courts instead of at the facts. [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 809.
22. 51 Ill. App. 2d at 612, 210 N.E.2d at 182. Admittedly, the "event" caused
damage to other property (a bus) as well as plaintiff's vehicle. Whether this distinction is sufficient to deny recovery in product liability where damage occurs
only to the product itself will be reserved for further discussion elsewhere in this

article.
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Suvada appears to hold that where it is alleged that the seller or
manufacturer was negligent or that a product was dangerously defective, recovery could be had for damage to the product itself.23
A similar factual situation arose in Seely v. White Motor Company,2 " a California Supreme Court case cited with approval by
Koplin. Although Seely involved a multi-type loss, part of the
plaintiff's claim was in strict liability for damage resulting to his
truck. Seely involved a spontaneous event, the truck's overturning.
However, that event resulted in only a single-vehicle accident. Although recovery in strict liability for damage to the product was
denied because the plaintiff failed to prove that the defect was the
25
cause of the accident, the action was recognized.
The Koplin court stated that "[tihe line of demarcation between physical harm and economic loss in our view reflects the line
of demarcation between tort theory and contract theory." Thus,
the crucial question is which, if any, of the various types of losses
constitute physical harm. Koplin sought to distinguish physical
harm by defining economic loss. Citing one author, the court defined economic loss as "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss
of profits," without claim for personal injury or damage to other
property.2 6 As one author has pointed out, the Koplin reference
was incomplete.2 7 The author of the definition adopted by the Koplin court further distinguished situations where damage occurred
to the product itself, as when "the defect causes an accident involving some violence or collision with external objects," and he
23. Id. at 326, 201 N.E.2d at 318. The subject of the Suvada appeal to the
appellate court by the plaintiff was the dismissal of several counts against the
immediate seller and remote manufacturer, all but one seeking indemnification.
The one non-indemnity count sought recovery for property damage to the plaintiff's truck against the remote manufacturer based on a breach of warranty theory. Although the remote manufacturer claimed privity was required, the appel-

late court stated it was not necessary and held that a

...product that is inherently dangerous or defectively made constitutes
an exception to the requirement of privity characterizing it as 'strict tort
liability' ('surely a more accurate phrase') in an action between the user
of the product and its manufacturer. [Emphasis added.] Id. at 326, 201

N.E.2d at 318.
24. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).

25. Id. at 16, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
26. 49 Ill. App. 3d at 199, 364 N.E.2d at 103.
27. Peldyak, Recovery in Tort for PropertyDamage Absent Personal Injury,

68 ILL. BAR J. 94 (Oct. 1979).
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determined that the latter was "property damage."' 28
"Physical harm" as referred to in the Restatement (Second)
includes physical harm to property.2 ' Yet, the Restatement is silent as to whether this applies to physical harm to the product
itself. Not only did Koplin rely on the Restatement definition, the
court also chose to follow Seely as authority for denying recovery
for economic loss. However, to be consistent with Seely, recovery
would have been allowed if the loss involved damage to the product itself.
Although holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defect caused the damage to his truck, the Seely court agreed with
the plaintiff's claim that strict liability in tort should extend to
physical injury to the plaintiff's property as well as personal injury.
Relying on the Restatement, the court concluded that "physical
injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there is no
reason for distinguishing them."' 0
In accord with Seely is a later California Appellate Court decision, Gherna v. Ford Motor Co."1 Gherna sets forth the purest set
of facts for resolution of this issue. A cause of action was alleged in
tort for fire destruction to a consumer's automobile (absent other
property damage) as a result of an alleged defect. Citing Seely, the
court stated, "It is settled that the doctrine of strict liability applies to physical harm to person or property."'" The court further
held that recovery could be had on a res ipsa loquitur theory as
well as negligence, unaided by the res ipsa doctrine.83 To the same
effect is Cornell Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor Co.," a Pennsylvania
case. Cornell sought recovery in strict liability for damage to a
truck destroyed by fire. The trial court dismissed the complaint
because plaintiff's evidence lacked proof of all the elements necessary to establish a cause of action under section 402A of the Restatement of Torts Second. Strict liability for physical harm re28. The author of the Columbia Law Review article, see note 20, supra, cited
in Koplin, footnoted the above description with the case of Fentress v. Van Etta
Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, P.2d 229 (Super. Ct. App. Dept. 1958), a case involving damage only to an auto caused by negligent manufacture of brakes.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (3) 1965. "The words 'physical
harm' are used throughout the Restatement of this subject to denote the physical

impairment of the human body, or of land or chattels."
30. 63 Cal. 2d at 16, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
31. 246 Cal. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966).
32. Id. at 646, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
33. Id., 55 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
34. 359 A.2d 822 (Super. Ct. of Pa. 1976).
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suits under section 402A if one sells a product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and the product is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it
was sold. The Pennsylvania Appellate Court reversed the trial
court's holding in Cornell and found the issue to be a jury question, thereby impliedly holding that section 402A was applicable to
situations where only the product itself was damaged.36
One of the best judicial arguments for finding that section
402A includes damage to the product itself can be found in Air
Products & Chem. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc.3s In applying Pennsylvania law and allowing recovery, the Wisconsin court cited with
approval the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Kassab v.
Central Soya3 7 and particularly the Kassab position on the
Restatement:
The language of the Restatement, speaking as it does of injury to
either the individual or his property, appears broad enough to
cover practically all of the harm that could befall one due to a
defective product. Thus, for example, were one to buy a defective
gas range which exploded, ruining the buyer's kitchen, injuring
him, and of course necessitating a replacement of the stove itself,
all of these three elements of the injury should be compensable.

The last, replacing the stove, has been sometimes referred to as
'economic loss,' i.e., the diminution in the value of the product

because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general
purposes for which it was manufactured and sold. There would
seem to be no reason for excluding this measure of damages in an
action brought under the Restatement, since the defective product itself is as much 'property' as any other possession of the
plaintiff that is damaged as a result of the manufacturing flaw.
Thus, since the tort action would enable plaintiff to recover for
economic loss (the physical harm necessitated by 402A would ipso
facto be present given the defect in the product which caused the
damage), so also should this form of damages be compensable in
contract. 8

The Illinois Supreme Court has declined to state unequivocally that damage to property itself constitutes "physical damage"
35. Id. at 828.
36. 58 Wis. 2d 193, 218-19, 206 N.W.2d 414, 427 (1973).

37. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
38. Id. at 224, 246 A.2d at 854.
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as defined in the Restatement. To do so, however, would seem to
be wholly consistent with Koplin as well as the case law relied
upon by Koplin.
Although the Proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act
(UPLA) has met with some criticism, " it would presently contemplate damage to the product itself as coming within the definition
of "harm."4 1 Section 102(F) merely defines "harm" as including

"damage to property," but an analysis of the section indicates the
term also includes damage to the product itself.4 This definition,
however, would require clarification of the law in some states and
change the law in others. 3 It may be argued that in the absence of
personal injury, any product that causes damage solely to itself is
not unreasonably dangerous and, therefore, does not come within
the strict liability rule. However, this would appear to be an out44
come oriented argument.
39. See Century Display Mfg. Corp. v. D. R. Wager Const. Co., 71 III. 2d 428,
434, 376 N.E.2d 993, 996 (1978). The court was called upon to decide whether fire
damage to plaintiff's building as well as other property came within the definition
of "physical harm" as described in the Restatement. In holding that such definition encompasses "damage to tangible property as well as injuries to the person"
it further stated,
Because of the disposition we make of this case we need not decide another of defendant's contentions, that is, whether recovery under section
353 is permissible for damages to the property which is the subject of
the transfer from the vendor to the vendee, or whether such recovery is
limited to damages to other property of the vendee which is located on
the conveyed premises. [Emphasis supplied.]
Id. at 434.
40. Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law,
28 DRAKE L. RPv. 221, 222-23 (1978-79). See also, Phillips, A Synopsis of Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. Rav. 317 (1978-79), for an up-todate and extensive analysis of the whole subject of product liability.
41. Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 212, 62719 (Oct. 31, 1979).
42. See Frumer & Friedman, 2A Products Liability § 16E Model UPLA pp.
37-38 which states:
There is strong case law support for leaving direct economic loss cases to
the field of commercial law ....
Courts that have allowed recovery in
tort where the purchased property is 'destroyed,' but not where there is
'mere loss of the bargain,' have had difficulty applying this distinction
where the product is wholly ineffective. . . . For this reason and the fact
that loss of the bargain damages are in essence a part of commercial law,
claims for direct economic harm have been left to the Uniform Commercial Code. [Emphasis supplied.]
43. Birnbaum, "Model Products Liabilities Law Tries To Balance Many Interests," THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, March 12, 1979, p. 22.
44. Under the above premises, no recovery would be allowed where a product
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As early as 1915, the Appellate Court of New York, in Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co.,' posed this question: "Does the manufacturer of a machine not inherently dangerous to human life or
limb, but which, being defectively constructed ...causes injury
solely to such machine, constitute negligence on the part of such
manufacturer?" In response to its own query the court stated:
We are asked to hold that the manufacturer's duty is made to
depend, not upon the question of the inherent danger of the
enginery which he places in the public highways, but upon the
result of the accident which grows out of his faults in construction .... We think this is not the rule; that the manufacturer's

duty depends, not upon the results of the accident, but upon the
fact that his failure to properly construct the car resulted in the
accident."

Another question is whether tort recovery for damage to the
product itself should be limited to areas covered by the law of
sales. To the extent that the parties are in privity and the damage
suffered is "economic loss," Album Graphics allows recovery only
containing a defect that rendered it unreasonably dangerous (airplane, automobile, or construction crane) caused an accident that resulted only in damage to
itself. But recovery would be allowed where products expected to be innocuous
(i.e., hammer, Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247
N.E.2d 401 (1969), or concrete nail, Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6, 235
N.E.2d 439 (1968), contained a defect rendering it unreasonably dangerous so as
to cause personal injury. It is submitted it is not the character of the damage
caused that makes the product unreasonably dangerous but a product is unreasonably dangerous when it is, in the words of Dean Prosser, "not safe for such a
use that can be expected to be made of it." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50
MINN. L. REv. 791, 826 (1966). As noted by Justice Schaefer in Dunham:
Although the definitions of the term 'defect' in the context of product
liability law use varying language, all of them rest upon the common premise that those products are defective which are dangerous because they
fail to perform in the manner reasonably expected in light of their nature
and intended function.
42 Ill. 2d at 342, 247 N.E.2d at 403. The Restatement does not define "unreasonably dangerous" in an outcome oriented way. Rather, it states:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 402A, Comment I. It requires looking to the
product, not the eventual damage. For an analysis of Dean Prosser's views of
when physical damages are recoverable, see 50 MINN. L. REv.at 820-23.
45. 167 A.D. 433, 435, 153 N.Y.S. 131-32 (1915).
46. Id. at 437, 153 N.Y.S. at 133.
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under contract. It is clear that in so holding, the court recognized
that when purely economic losses are involved the intent of the
parties ought to be enforceable in contract regarding the limitations or disclaimers and express or implied warranties, to the exclusion of any tort theory of recovery. But this indicates that the
court may make a distinction when property damage is involved.4 7
While the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are
found to be entirely reasonable when applied to contracting parties, which usually implies a commercial setting, these provisions
are inadequate when applied to sub-purchaser and manufacturer
situations. The most obvious example of this is the Code's requirement that the buyer give notice to the seller of a breach or thereafter be barred from recovery. ' 8 In a commercial setting, the intent
of the Code is to provide a reasonable time for the buyer to give
notice of a defect after "acceptance," thus relieving the buyer from
the seller's claim that acceptance constituted a waiver.49 However,
if a breach of implied warranty is involved, this provision becomes
harsh, if not wholly unreasonable, when applied to a purchaserremote manufacturer situation. Recognizing this, the Illinois Appellate Court, in Goldstein v. G. D. Searle & Co.,50 held that this
section obligates a purchaser to notify only the immediate seller
and not a remote manufacturer. While recognizing the rule to be
that a remote manufacturer may raise as a defense against the purchaser the lack of notice by purchaser to his immediate seller,
Goldstein limited the meaning of "seller" to the one from whom
tender is accepted. Thus, the court stated, such a rule obviates
placing a duty upon the unsophisticated consumer to notify a
party with whom he has not dealt.51
It is, therefore, the author's opinion that tort recovery in Illinois should be allowed for Type One loss under both a strict liability theory as in Suvada and under a negligence theory as in
Admiral.5

47. Ill.
App. 3d -, .N.E.2d - (No. 79-1183) (1st Dist. 1980). "Here ... we
are not faced with . . .any tangible injury to person or property resulting from

the alleged conduct on the part of the defendant."
48. U.C.C. § 2-607 (3)(a)(1976), ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 26, § 2-607 (3)(a)(1979).
49. S. M. Wilson & Co. v. Reeves Red-E-Mi Concrete, 39 Ill. App. 3d 353, 350
N.E.2d 321 (5th Dist. 1976).
50. 62 Ill.
App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1st Dist. 1978).
51. Id. at 349, 378 N.E.2d at 1088.
52. Since the need for alleging strict liability almost always arises in cases of
non-privity, Album Graphics should have no impact on strict liability cases. The

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Type Two Loss: Spontaneous Physical Damage to the Product
Causing Physical Damage to Other Property
Type Two loss is the physical damage to the product itself as a
result of an internal defect that causes physical damage to other
property. The common elements are: a defect in the product, as
opposed to the product wearing out due to age or overuse; a spontaneous event; the defect proximately causes the event; and physical damage to other property. A good example of this type of damage is the fire damage originating in an air conditioner caused by
its defective wiring and communicated to the building.
Again, Suvada would be an example of Type Two loss. In
Suvada, the defective brake mechanism caused an accident (the
spontaneous event) that damaged not only the product itself, but
other property (a bus). It could also be argued that Admiral is a
Type Two loss since at least some of the damage caused by the air
conditioners was to hotel rooms as a result of leaking water. Although Admiral does not specifically identify the damage-causing
event, the court does recognize a cause of action in tort against the
manufacturer for placing a negligently designed or manufactured
machine on the market. Further support for this position is found
in a footnote in the Koplin decision where, in attempting to distinguish Admiral from Rhodes, the court stated that the former "involved damage to other property as well as economic loss in replacing the malfunctioning units." 8
Recovery in tort for Type Two loss is clearly recognized by the
Restatement 4 under strict liability and under Admiral in
negligence.58
court emphasized it was dealing with only "economic loss". The issue was not
whether a cause of action in negligence should be recognized in general against a
manufacturer for purely economic losses but, rather, whether a plaintiff can recover purely economic losses for the failure of a defendant to perform duties imposed by contract. The impact of Album Graphics would seem to be limited to
privity cases where pure economic loss is claimed as a result of negligence.
53. 49 Ill. App. 3d at 203, 364 N.E.2d at 106.
54. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1) (1965).

55. 68 Ill. App.2d 297, 216 N.E.2d 282 (1st Dist. 1965). The traditional elements of strict liability (e.g., product containing unreasonably dangerous condition, condition existed at time product left control of manufacturer, condition
proximate cause of damage), as well as elements of negligence (e.g., duty, breach,
proximate cause, freedom from contributory negligence) are presupposed
throughout this discussion and are indispensable for recovery under either theory
no matter what the character of the damage.
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Type Three Loss: Spontaneous Physical Damage to the Product
Causing Other Types of Non-Property Damage
The third category of damage is spontaneous physical damage
to the product itself that causes other types of non-property damage. The common elements are: a defect in the product, as opposed
to the product wearing out due to age or overuse; a spontaneous
event; the defect proximately causes the event; the event cuts off
the flow of income; and the product is used in a commercial setting. An illustration of this Type Three loss is fire damage originating in an air conditioner which results in the interruption of a business and the consequential loss of profits.
If the reader accepts the existence of a spontaneous event in
Admiral, as apparently the Koplin court did, then Admiral is an
example of Type Three damage. In Admiral, recovery was sought
for the loss of rental income. 6 However, the facts in Suvada are
not consistent with the elements characterizing this type of loss.
Although the event in Suvada was spontaneous, the loss was physical damage to property as opposed to a non-property type of loss
such as lost profits.
A good example of Type Three loss can be found in Mead
Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Company.5 7 The Mead case
involved a claim for business losses due to a turbine outage as well
as damages for repair of the turbine due to a spontaneous accident.
Applying Ohio law, the federal district court allowed recovery for
both types of losses.
At first glance, it might be predicted that Illinois would not
recognize recovery in strict liability for Type Three loss. In arriving at this opinion, it might be argued that since Koplin adopted
the Seely rationale and Seely refused to extend recovery in strict
liability to lost profits, than Illinois would also arrive at the same
result. However, the claim of damages for lost profits in Seely was
unrelated to the accident. In Seely, the lost profits were incurred
as a result of "down time" necessitated by frequent repairs occasioned prior to and not associated with the accident. Those damages obviously are not within the scope of Type Three loss, but
properly within Type Five."
56. The rationale with respect to allowing damages in a negligence action beyond damage to the property itself (where no privity exists) was considered in
Admiral and will be reserved for discussion in another part of this article.
57. 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
58. 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22, 403 P.2d at 150.
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If there is an accident with accompanying physical harm, Type
Three damage should be compensable in Illinois under allegations
of negligence, at least in the absence of privity. Admiral specifically addressed the issue by questioning whether the damages
sought were foreseeable to the defendant when he put the product
on the market. The court observed:
It could be argued that even if the manufacturer were held responsible for damages to carpets and draperies, it should not be
held liable for loss of rents. The rationale behind such an argument is that any manufacturer should realize that any air conditioner is likely to be placed in a room that is furnished with carpets, rugs, or draperies. If these machines leak, damage is likely.
Such an argument would then urge that a manufacturer of air
conditioners should not be held to be on notice that the machines
could be sold to a hotel or motel where the lack of proper air
conditioning could cause a loss of revenue."
The court found that the trier of fact should determine whether
the manufacturer could have foreseen the possibility that the lack
of proper air conditioning could cause a loss of revenue.
Type Four Loss: Non-Spontaneous Damage to the Product Causing Failure of the Product to Function According to Expectations
Type Four loss concerns the non-spontaneous damage to the
product itself as a result of an internal defect causing the product
to fail to function according to the purchaser's expectations. The
common elements are: a defect in the product; underperformance
or insidious deterioration - a non-spontaneous event; the defect
proximately causes the underperformance or the insidious deterioration; and the product loses its value. An example of this type of
loss is an air conditioner that fails to cool as expected, but otherwise is not damaged. The Koplin case dealt with this type of loss,
among others. 0 Koplin involved no spontaneous event, only the
claim that the air conditioners did not function as could reasonably be expected. Therefore, Koplin involved a product's underperformance or insidious deterioration - a non-event. Also, Koplin dealt with the type of damage that might be characterized as
"economic disappointment," rather than recovery for
physical
damage.
Although it may be argued to the contrary, another Illinois
59. 68 Ill. App. 2d at 308, 216 N.E.2d at 287.
60. 49 Ill.
App. 3d at 199, 364 N.E.2d at 103.
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case that fits into Type Four loss is Rhodes. In Rhodes, the seller
of a product sued the remote manufacturer for the cost of replacement of defective aerosol cans as well as lost profits and good will.
The cans did not explode. Instead, a defective seam caused the
cans to rust, allowing leakage of the solution with resultant damage
to other property. Whether or not the "rusting," under other circumstances (i.e., explosion) would have constituted a spontaneous
event was not under consideration. The Illinois Appellate Court
denied recovery on the basis of strict liability.
One of the leading cases outside the jurisdiction of Illinois illustrating this Type Four loss is Santor v.A & M Karagneusian,
Inc."1 This is one of the major cases supporting a conclusion contrary to that expressed in Rhodes; i.e., allowing recovery for Type
Four loss on the basis of strict liability. In Santor, the plaintiff
purchased a carpet that, over a period of time, developed a "line"
in it. He sued the remote manufacturer for breach of an implied
warranty for the recovery of the lost value of the carpeting. The
New Jersey Supreme Court, holding that liability was not dependent upon a dangerous condition in the product or the presence of
personal injury, allowed recovery by stating, "the responsibility of
the maker should be no different where damage to the article sold
' 6 2 Although
or to other property of the consumer is involved.
Santor did not arise from a commercial setting, a similar result
was reached in a commercial setting where it was alleged that the
carpeting was defective. 8
Those cases that deny Type Four loss recovery uniformly classify the loss as pecuniary or economic, but deny recovery for various reasons. An analysis of those reasons will hereafter be made
when discussing the status of Types Four, Five, and Six losses in
Illinois.
Type Five Loss: Non-Spontaneous Damage to the Product Causing Failureof the Product to Function According to Expectations
and Resulting in Other Types of Non-Property Damage
Type Five loss is non-spontaneous damage to the product itself that causes the product to fail to function according to the
purchaser's expectations and results in other types of non-property
61. 82 N.J. Super. 319, 197 A.2d 587, rev'd. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
62. Id. at 60, 207 A.2d at 312.
63. Spartanburg Hotel Corp. v. Alexander Smith, Inc., 231 S.C. 1, 97 S.E.2d
199 (1957).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

damage. The common elements are: a defect in the product; underperformance or insidious deterioration - a non-spontaneous
event; the defect proximately causes the underperformance or insidious deterioration; the underperformance causes loss of income;
and the product is used in a commercial setting. An example of
Type Five loss is an air conditioner which fails to cool as expected,
is otherwise not damaged, but results in loss of rentals or profits.
Accepting the fact that Rhodes involved a non-spontaneous
event, this case illustrates a Type Five loss. The complaint in
Rhodes involved a claim for lost profits. Although Admiral involved a claim for lost rentals, it does not properly classify as a
Type Five loss since a spontaneous event took place.
In Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp.,6" a North Carolina case,
a Type Five loss was recoverable. In Corprew, it was alleged that a
chemical weed killer was sold with insufficient warnings by the
manufacturer. This resulted in a substantially smaller yield of soybeans but apparently no spontaneous damage. As will be discussed
later, Illinois does not recognize recovery for this type of loss.
Type Six Loss: Damages As a Result of Repairing or Replacing a
Defective Part to Prevent Spontaneous or Non-Spontaneous
Damage
Type Six loss involves damage as a result of the necessity of
repairing or replacing a defective part in order to prevent spontaneous or non-spontaneous damage. The common elements are: a
defect in the product which has the potential to damage or destroy
the product if not repaired or replaced; a non-spontaneous event insidious deterioration; a defect discovered prior to damage; and
the repair or replacement costs expended to make the product
"whole." An example of this type of loss is the cost of replacing a
defective part in the air conditioner in order to prevent damage or
destruction to the unit itself.
The most distinguishing characteristic of Type Six loss is the
discovery of the potential harm before it occurs. A user fortuitously discovers that the product has a defect that, if not corrected, will either cause its early deterioration or destruction.
Therefore, the user incurs the expense of fixing the product. It
would be expected that this type of loss would be limited to a narrow scope of factual situations dealing with commercial products
which are quantitatively or qualitatively costly. Otherwise, the mo64. 271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
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tive for incurring the cost of "repair" would be absent.
The case of TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 5 offers a classic ex-

ample of this type of damage. Having incurred heavy costs for replacing a latently defective part in fifty-five aircraft engines manufactured by Curtiss, TWA sued in negligence for recovery of this
loss. Privity was absent so the principles of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co." were controlling. Neither an accident nor physical
damage was involved. However, it was alleged that if the defective
parts were not replaced potential damage would result.
TWA v. Curtiss-Wright is valuable for its thorough analysis of
the subject under discussion, as well as the particular damage pertinent here. The New York Court of Appeals held the loss was
non-compensable. While agreeing that a remote manufacturer
could be held liable in negligence to the ultimate purchaser for
physical damage to the product itself, as well as physical damage
to other property, the court held that such damage had to occur as
a result of an "accident. 67 Although the court acknowledged that
a maker of a product owes a duty to the public, the breach of
which entitles one who suffers injury to recover, the court nevertheless observed that "[uintil there is an accident, there can be no
loss arising from breach of this duty. Though negligence may endanger . . . property . . . no actionable wrong is committed if the
danger is averted."'6 8 As the following discussion illustrates, Illinois
does not recognize this type of loss.
TYPES FOUR,

FIvE,

AND Six LOSSES: ECONoMIc LOSSES IN ILLINOIS

Aside from the internal distinctions within Types Four, Five,
and Six losses, the lack of physical harm caused by a spontaneous
event invites a totally different approach with respect to the application of product liability. It is in this area that the courts, although using diverse and sometimes circuitous reasoning, generally
characterize the damage as some form of "economic loss."
The only judicial definition of that term by an Illinois court is
found in Koplin, wherein it held economic loss to be the "diminution of the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and
65. 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), aff'd without opinion, 2 App.
Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1st Dept. 1956).
66. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
67. 1 Misc. 2d at 482. 148 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
68. Id. citing Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300,
200 N.E. 824, 827 (1936).
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does not work for the general purpose for which it was manufactured and sold.'" That definition anticipates economic loss to encompass only products that fall short of reasonable expectations of
performance, as opposed to those products damaged or destroyed
by a defect-caused accident. In reaching its decision, the Koplin
court cited with approval Prosser's distinction between the need
for applying theories of tort or contract. The court agreed that the
former is "created to protect the interest in freedom from various
kinds of harm." The latter is "created to protect the interest in
having promises performed." Further, "the damages recoverable
for a breach of the contract duty are limited to those reasonably
within the contemplation of the defendant . . . while in a tort ac7' 0
tion a much broader measure of damages is applied.
Thus, Illinois clearly does not recognize recovery for Types
Four, Five, and Six losses. It is here that Rhodes, Koplin, and Album Graphics, in varying language, uniformly state the Illinois
rule to be that tort recovery for mere economic loss is not compensable. When Types Four, Five, and Six losses are under consideration, the decision in Rhodes is wholly compatible with refusing to
extend tort liability to economic loss, e.g., lost profits and claims
for reimbursement of refunds to customers.
In Rhodes, the plaintiff was apparently confronted with two
problems: a lack of proof sufficient to create liability in negligence
and the absence of any direct contractual relationship between itself and the remote manufacturer. The plaintiff, therefore, sought
to impose liability under a strict liability tort theory where the
69. 49 Ill. App. 3d at 199, 364 N.E.2d at 103.
70. Id. at 198, 364 N.E.2d at 103. The argument rightfully points to the premise that a consumer should not be able to charge the manufacturer with the risk
that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the latter agrees
to do so. Such an argument falls short, in the author's opinion, when the product
itself is damaged or destroyed as a result of a defect. Take, for example, the purchaser of a new car. It is one thing to charge the manufacturer with the buyer's
"expectation" that the car will last for "x" miles of travel at "x" miles an hour, or
dependably start in "x" weather. Agreeably, absent a promise to make such a car,
the manufacturer ought not to have to meet those "expectations." It is entirely
different, however, to charge the manufacturer with the buyer's "expectation"
that the car, while maybe not being mechanically perfect, is at least not going to
self-destruct as a result of a defect. It is suggested the latter is no more than
charging the manufacturer with the duty of making a product reasonably free
from a defect causing harm, whether that harm is done to persons, other property,
or itself. It would appear that the duty is no more broad with reference to "persons" than it is to "property."
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presence of privity is unnecessary. The trial court found that no
contractual relationship had been established between the plaintiff
and the manufacturer, nor had there been established any other
legally recognizable basis sufficient to support a warranty theory.
On appeal, the appellate court chose to reject plaintiff's strict
liability argument, and resolved the case on a third party beneficiary theory. The court held the implied warranty of fitness imposed by law on a manufacturer may be enforced by a third party
user where the manufacturer was aware of the product's purpose
and knew of the third party user's reliance on the fact that the
product would be fit for the purpose intended. 7'
If the reasons for denying recovery in tort lacked specificity in
Rhodes, they were thereafter made clear by Koplin. Koplin involved a Type Four loss, assuming no spontaneous event had occurred, which can reasonably be inferred from the facts of the case.
The case dealt with a product described by the layman as a
"lemon." The product, while not being so defective that it caused
damage or destruction, nevertheless, did not work as expected, was
subject to chronic breakdowns, and required frequent repair. While
the principles of strict liability may be properly applied to a product that is destroyed or damaged as a result of a defect rendering it
unreasonably dangerous the Koplin type of event did not contain
the type of damage giving rise to such considerations.
Similarly, the Album Graphics case did not give rise to such
considerations. There, the parties conceded that only economic loss
was involved. There was no spontaneous event or physical damage.
The parties were in privity and had set forth their respective obligations. In denying recovery in tort, the court stated that if a valid
contract provision limits the remedy for economic losses arising
from breach of that contract then under plaintiff's theory, one
would merely have to allege and prove that a party acted negligently in the performance of his contractual duties to escape such
a limitation. Under this theory the law of tort, and not the contract or the law of contracts, would define the extent of liability. If
plaintiff's theory had been adopted, the mere act of breach of contract would have been considered a tortious act with the extent of
liability depending upon the degree of fault. When only economic
losses are at issue, such a position is untenable.
Some courts further categorize an "economic loss" by creating
subcatagories allowing recovery in some cases and denying it in
71. 72 Il. App. 2d at 373, 219 N.E.2d at 732.
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others. In Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Company, a
case applying Ohio law, the court compared "direct economic loss"
("loss attributable to the decreased value of the product itself")
with "indirect economic loss." The latter type of loss was "the consequential damage an owner of a defective product sustains."' 2 Referring to a former Ohio decision7 8 which allowed strict tort liability recovery against a contractor who installed a driveway which
later was found to be defective, the Mead court observed:
While the Ohio Supreme Court labeled the recovery in Iacono to
be for 'property damage,' the plaintiff ... was really compensated for his direct economic loss ... the difference of the value
of what he had paid for and the value of what he7 had received.
This is clearly a recovery of direct economic loss. '

Thus, Mead allowed recovery for damage to the product itself
(Type One loss) although classifying it as direct economic loss
(Type Four). The court allowed recovery for business losses which
it had characterized as "indirect economic loss" (Type Five).
In contrast with Mead is the decision of the Ohio Supreme
Court in Ingles v. American Motors Corp. Ingles involved facts
significantly distinguishable from the cases discussed thus far. In
Ingles, the plaintiff sued the seller and the manufacturer alleging
negligence for failing to properly inspect an auto which turned out
to be a "lemon" causing a $1,500 loss (the difference between the
purchase price and market value of the car). The court, in denying
recovery for negligence, stated, "Plaintiff does not allege that this
negligence caused any damage to his person or to property he owns
other than the auto is not worth what he paid for it."76 [Emphasis
added.]
Other states have refused to recognize recovery for economic
loss without regard to subcategories. In a case involving a drop
forge, a federal district court interpreted Iowa law to bar recovery
in strict liability for benefit of the bargin damages, i.e., recovery

for installation, repairs, and good will. 77 Also, Massachusetts has

denied recovery absent personal injuries or physical damage to
72.
73.
(1975).
74.
75.
76.
77.
1975).

465 F. Supp. at 365.
Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267
465 F. Supp. at 366.
3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
Id. at 138, 209 N.E.2d at 588.
Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Industries, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa

[1980:57]

TORT RECOVERY ABSENT PERSONAL INJURY

property, characterizing such damage as "simple pecuniary loss
'7 8
caused by defective or inferior merchandise.
So, too, Nebraska has refused to apply strict tort liability
where the action was brought as a result of a collapsed scaffold.79
Reluctant to abandon warranty theories, the court stated:
We feel that the doctrine of strict tort liability was not conceived
as a substitute for warranty liability in cases where the purchaser
has only lost the benefit of his bargain .... If the loss is merely
economic, the UCC has given the purchaser an ample recourse
under the particular provisons and requirements of the Code.80
Finally, no.better example contrasting the difference between
Types One, Two, and Three losses and Four, Five, and Six losses
can be found than in two Alaska cases involving a substantially
similar product. In Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,8 ' the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a mobile home in strict liability for
recovery of the bargain where the product exhibited various defects such as a vibrating blower, ill-fitting doors, flickering lights,
and cracked windows. Recovery was denied on the basis that social
and economic reasons extending strict liability recovery to personal
injuries and property damage do not exist with regard to damages
for pure economic loss.82
Months later, the Alaska Supreme Court was called upon
again to apply the strict liability doctrine in Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co. 83 The product, as in Morrow, was a mobile home.
The plaintiff alleged that the carpet pad was defective, rendering
the home dangerously inflammable and eventually causing destruction by fire to the home and its contents. Kit allowed recovery for
the damage to the product as well as its contents. The court distinguished Morrow by stating that the claim in Morrow did not arise
from an accident. The court cited its previous decision of Clary v.
78. McDonough v. Whalen, 1 Mass. App. 857, 304 N.E.2d 199, 201 (1973).
See also, Marcil v. Deere Indus. Equip. Co., -Mass. App.-, 403 N.E.2d 430
(1980), wherein the Massachusetts Appellate Court denied recovery in negligence
where damage to the product was alleged, holding it was economic loss and citing
Koplin as authority.
79. Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews, Inc., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d
643 (1973).
80. Id. at 553, 209 N.W. 2d at 650.
81. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
82. Id. at 286.
83. 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
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Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 4 wherein it was held that the
purpose of imposing strict liability is to insure that the cost of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturer. The Kit court observed that "[a] similar need arises when
the consumer's property rather than person is damaged due to a
8
defect in the manufacture of the particular product." 65
"Economic loss," within the context of Types Four, Five, and
Six losses, therefore, is treated with more uniformity by most
courts in the nation. Thus, the Koplin decision is consistent with
what is believed to be the majority rule, although an actual count
of jurisdictions has not been made.
As has already been stated, no Illinois Supreme Court case denying or allowing recovery in products liability for damage solely
to the product itself has been found. While Suvada and Admiral
would appear to support recovery, the issue, in the author's opinion, has yet to be resolved by the highest court of the state. However, for the reasons presented the author believes that Illinois
should allow recovery in strict tort liability or negligence where
Type One, Two, or Three loss is alleged, at least where the parties
are not involved in a private relationship.
CONCLUSION

It is as important to focus on the character of the facts as it is
on the legal results. When the nature of the event and the character of the damage is examined, the rationale behind the various
decisions, although not uniform, becomes somewhat clearer.
In reviewing the foregoing cases, it can be observed that courts
have been somewhat casual in their description of both the event
and the damage suffered. The factual basis of the event in Suvada
(collision with another vehicle) justified recovery. However, the
facts in Rhodes (under the previously suggested liberal interpretation of "accident") could also support recovery for damage to the
product itself, although perhaps not recovery for lost profits or
good will. Would the Rhodes court have allowed recovery if the
aerosol cans had exploded and caused no damage (except to the
product itself) and no loss of profits had been alleged? In Santor,
if the carpeting, as a result of a defect, had caught fire and was
destroyed (a spontaneous event), would Illinois allow recovery?
Opponents of extending liability (if indeed it is an extension)
84. 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969).
85. 563 P.2d at 250-51.
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no doubt will readily cite the above as examples of situations in
which undisciplined courts may expose makers and sellers of products to damages they could not reasonably anticipate. In any
event, one should recognize and attempt to describe with some
uniformity the "character" of the event that creates the damage
and the "type" of loss involved, before applying concepts of product liability.
Whether the event be termed an accident or occurrence, the
minimum definition ought to include spontaneity, damage in terms
of momentary violence, a "sudden and calamitous occurrence," or
a "catastrophe" of large or small proportion." So, too, the description of the type of damage under consideration ought to be clearly
set forth. Distinction ought to be made between cost of replacement or repair due to harm or destruction as opposed to replacement cost due to a "loss of the bargain," economic disappointment,
or costs incurred in avoiding potential damage or destruction. 87
The term "economic loss" runs the whole gamut of "damage"
from damage to the product istelf, 8 to lost profits, 89 to time and
replacement costs to customers." The proposed analysis is necessary to create a clear set of facts to determine whether a plaintiff
comes within that class of consumers or users who can seek recovery. More fundamentally, the analysis determines whether the type
of event necessitates a tort recovery at all.

86. 563 P.2d at 248.

87. 66 COLUM. L. REV. at 951.

88. Id. at 918.

89. 465 F. Supp. at 363.
90. 66 COLUM. L. REV. at

951.

